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Abstract—Trust game is a money exchange game that has
been widely used in behavioral economics for studying trust and
collaboration between humans. In this game, exchange of money
is entirely attributable to the existence of trust between users.
The trust game could be one-shot, i.e. the game ends after one
round of money exchange, or repeated, i.e. it lasts several rounds.
Predicting user behavior in the repeated trust game is of critical
importance for the next movement of the partners. However,
existing behavior prediction approaches uniquely rely on players
personal information such as their age, gender and income and
do not consider their past behavior in the game.
In this paper, we propose a computational trust metric that
is uniquely based on users past behavior and can predict the
future behavior in repeated trust game. Our trust metric can
distinguish between users having different behavioral profiles
and is resistant to fluctuating user behavior. We validate our
model by using an empirical approach against data sets collected
from several trust game experiments. We show that our model
is consistent with rating opinions of users, and our model can
provide higher accuracy on predicting users’ behavior compared
with other naive models.
Index Terms—trust management, computational trust, non-
cooperative games, behavioral game theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Studying cooperation between users is a main topic of re-
search in economy, psychology and computer science. Invest-
ment game or trust game proposed by Berg [1] is an important
tool to study trust and collaboration [2]. The experiment has
been repeated thousands of times all over the world1. In this
game two users exchange money in anonymous mode. The
sender sends an amount to the receiver. This amount is tripled
when it arrives to the receiver. The receiver then selects an
amount that should not exceed the sum received to send back
to the sender. This time, the amount is not tripled when it
arrives to the sender. The money exchange between users is
entirely attributable to the existence of trust between them.
The model of trust game can be applied for the cooperation
between users that are located in different places that do not
know each other. For instance, in e-commerce, buyers usually
need to pay before they can receive the goods, so they need
to trust the sellers.
1According to Google Scholar, the paper has been cited 3,810 times, as on
27-Jun-2016. An incomplete study counted that there are more than 23,000
participants involved in trust game experiments [3].
The trust game could be one-shot, i.e. the game ends after
one round of money exchange, or repeated, i.e. it lasts several
rounds [4], [5], [6]. The pairs of users could be fixed [7] or
re-assigned before each round [8]. The total number of rounds
in the experiment can be reported to users [9], [10] or not [6].
These games provide different kinds of partner information to
players, such as their gender, age and income [11], or their
past interaction history [12], [8]. Some of these games allow
communication between players [9], [13] or specification of
user contracts [14], [15].
Predicting partner behavior in the repeated trust game is
of critical importance. In e-commerce, for instance, it is
very important to predict the behavior of the partners before
transaction completion. Game theory predicts that, in trust
game, sender will send 0 and receiver will send back 0 [16].
However, in experimental game theory we usually do not
observe this user behavior. In fact, the sending behavior of
users in large-scale settings follows the normal distribution
[3].
Existing approaches on predicting behavior of participants
in one-shot trust game were proposed using additional infor-
mation related to players, such as the personal information
(age, gender, income, etc.) or the data collected through some
tests / questionnaires. However, the only reliable available in-
formation for predicting users behavior is their behavior during
previous transactions. No other work proposed prediction of
user behavior based on analysis of previous interactions.
In this paper, we present a computational trust metric, which
serves as a model for user behavior, to reflect and predict
user’s behavior in repeated trust games. We claim that, based
on users past behavior in the repeated trust game, we can
model and predict their next behavior. We only focus on
repeated version of original anonymous trust game, i.e. the
players have no information about their partners. We show that
our model is robust to several types of attacks. We validate
our model by using an empirical approach against data sets
collected from several trust game experiments. We prove that
our trust metric is consistent with users’ opinion about partners
trustworthiness.
The paper is structured as follows. We present related works
in Section II. In Section III we present our trust metric and in
section IV we describe its evaluation. Section V presents some
limitations of our metric. Concluding remarks are presented in
Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Several approaches on predicting behavior of participants
in one-shot trust game were proposed using additional infor-
mation related to players, such as their personal information
(e.g. age, gender, income) or evaluation collected through
some tests or questionnaires users needed to fill in before the
experiment.
Gunnthorsdottir et al. [17] used the Mach test on users
personality to predict their behavior in the game. Evans et
al. [18] predicted users behavior based on the results of
Propensity to Trust Survey. Using a similar idea, Yamagishi et
al. [19] defined a new model called attitudinal trust to predict
users’ behavior in one-shot trust game. The attitudinal trust is
calculated based on data collected through a questionnaire.
Yen [20] claimed that users with higher income send more
to their partners than users with lower income. Falk et al. [21]
confirmed this suggestion by showing that, students tend to
send less than other social groups.
Ashraf et al. [22] used the data collected in the dictator
game to predict the behavior of the same users in the trust
game.
In real world applications, sociometric information of users
is usually not available [23]. Even if this information is
available, such as a user login to a website by using Facebook
account, it is not always reliable as users can declare false
personal information. Our method to model and predict users’
behavior does not require any additional personal data.
We are not aware of any prior work that predicted users’
behavior in repeated trust game. The theoretical prediction is
that in the repeated trust game participants keep exchanging
an amount of 0 [16].
Glaeser et al. [24] used average value of previous sending
amount as the trust measurement of users in trust game. This
trust metric as average of previous sending amounts was used
later on by other research works [8], [3], [25]. However,
this average trust metric can not deal with user fluctuating
behavior, as we discuss in Section IV.
III. TRUST CALCULATION
We define our trust metric as a measure of how well a
user behaved in the past. We claim that we can predict users
behavior based on the computed trust metric. For instance, a
user with high trust score tends to behave well in the future. As
we discuss in Section IV-C2, some users try to behave well at
the beginning and then suddenly deviate. Our trust calculation
will take into account this strategy that we call fluctuate
strategy. In general, for trust games, trustworthiness of a user
depends on the amount sent to her partners [8], [24]. A higher
sending amount should lead to higher trustworthiness.
The trust score formula needs to satisfy the following
requirements:
1) The trust value is higher if the sending amount is higher.
2) The trust value can distinguish between different types
of users.
3) The trust value considers user behavior over time.
4) The trust value encourages a stable behavior rather than
a fluctuating one.
5) The trust value is robust against attacks.
A. Parameters initial values
The values of the parameters used for the trust metric
computation are displayed in Table I. The left side of the table
contains the initial values of the corresponding parameters,
while the right side of the table contains the constant values
of the corresponding parameters.
TABLE I
PARAMETER INITIAL VALUES.
α0 0. ε 0.3
β0 0. φ 0.1
atf0 0. MAX ATF 2.
expect trust0 0. threshold 0.25






As we described in Section I, in each round, two users
interact by sending a non-negative amount. For senders, the
maximum amount they can send is set to 10, and for receivers,
the maximum amount they can send is the amount they
received from the sender (i.e. three times of what the sender
sent). For both roles, we normalize the send proportiont as





It is obvious that ∀t, 0 ≤ send proportiont ≤ 1.
We define next the trust metric for a single interaction
between users that we call current trust. current trustt is a
function of send proportiont , meaning that the trustworthi-
ness of a user in a single interaction depends on how much she
sends to her partner in round t. We define current trustt as a
value between 0 and 1 inclusive. This function should satisfy
the following properties (for convenience, we use the notation
f(x), f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] for the function of current trustt ,
with x being send proportiont ):
• f(x) is continuous in [0, 1].
• f(0) = 0, meaning that current trust is 0 if the user
sends nothing.
• f(1) = 1, meaning that current trust is 1 if the user
sends the maximum possible amount.
• f ′(x) > 0 with x ∈ [0, 1], meaning that current trust is
strictly increasing when send proportion increases from
0 to 1. f ′(x) denotes the derivative of function f(x).
• f ′′(x) ≤ 0 with x ∈ [0, 1] meaning that the function is
concave, i.e. the closer to 1 the value of current trust
is, the harder is to increment it.
• f ′(x−) = f ′(x+),∀x ∈ [0, 1], meaning that the function
is smooth, i.e. there is no reason that at some point the
current trust increases roughly less than previously.
We proposed the following function that satisfies the above
mentioned conditions:
current trustt = log(send proportiont × (e− 1) + 1) (2)
where current trustt is the current trust function at round
t and send proportiont is the value of send proportion at
round t.
Explanation about the selection of the formula 2 will be
provided in Section IV-A2.
C. Aggregate Trust
current trustt uniquely computes the value of trust based
on the current interaction t. However, the previous inter-
actions between two users have to be taken into account.
The calculation of trust for multiple interactions is inspired
by the trust model SecuredTrust [26]. The main drawback
of SecuredTrust is that the metric assumes the existence of
current trustt value. However, as shown in the previous
subsection, computing current trust is not an easy task as
it has to satisfy certain requirements. Moreover, SecuredTrust
was mainly designed for peer-to-peer network systems, where
computation of the trust in a peer node relies on information
provided by the neighbours in the network. In this way, the
trust value in one peer is in fact the reputation of that peer
computed as an aggregation of the neighbor trust values on
that peer. Nevertheless, in collaborative environments different
users have different experiences with a certain user and
therefore their trust values on that user are different.
Furthermore, SecuredTrust uses a constant value of α as
forgetting factor. If this property can be valid in the peer-to-
peer network field, it does not hold for human users. Based on
psychological peak-end rule [27] we applied a dynamic α. The
peak-end rule claims that, in a series of experiences, humans
remember the extreme and the last experience, and forget the
other ones.
We calculate aggregate trust as follows:
δt = |current trustt − current trustt−1 | (3)
βt = c× δt + (1− c)× βt−1 (4)




aggregate trustt = αt × current trustt (6)
+ (1− αt)× aggregate trustt−1
As we described in the section III-A, current trust0 = 0.
The δt is the change of current trust value by two sequential
interactions t and t − 1 between two users. We calculated
δt to see how much a person changes her behavior since
her last activity. It is easy to prove that, αt is bigger if δt
is bigger, and vice versa. It means that, if the trust of the
current interaction is much different from accumulated trust
of all previous interactions, the current interaction will play a
more important role in the final trust value.
D. Dealing with fluctuating behavior
Some users may try to collaborate in the beginning and then
suddenly betray. We added a change ratet variable into our
model to punish this kind of activity.
First, we calculate the trend factort at round t representing
the recent trend of user behavior, with higher value meaning
that users improved lately their behavior:
trend factort =
trend factort−1 + φ
if current trustt − aggregate trustt > ε
trend factort−1 − φ












(current trustt−aggregate trustt )
2
if current trustt − aggregate trustt > φ
adj atft−1 + (aggregate trustt − current trustt)





0 if atft > MAX ATF
cos (π2 ×
atft
MAX ATF ) otherwise
(10)
In formula 9, we present the accumulated trust fluctuation
(atf) function. Both kinds of fluctuate behaviors are punished:
the latest sending amount is suddenly higher or lower than
usual behavior. However, it is obviously that the latter case is
more critical than the former one. Therefore, the punishment
in the latter case should be stronger.
The accumulated trust fluctuation is a non-decreasing func-
tion. The increase depends on the change over time of user’s
behavior. If the behavior is stable or it changes within the
allowed range (defined by the constant φ), atft will not change.
When atft reaches the threshold value MAX ATF, it means
that accumulated change in user behavior over time reaches
the level of betrayal and therefore change ratet drops to 0.
Otherwise, as shown by Equation 10, change ratet decreases
if atft increases.
The cosine function is used in formula 10 because the cos
function has a low degradation rate in the initial stage, and
a high degradation rate in the case of repeated fluctuating
behavior[26]. It means that, if a user starts adopting a fluc-
tuating behavior the punishment is low, but it increases fast
while fluctuating behavior persists.
Finally, the trust value after round t is calculated by:
trust valuet = expect trustt × change ratet (11)
where,
expect trustt = trend factort × current trustt
+ (1− trend factort)× aggregate trustt
The trust value is updated on every round.
IV. EVALUATION OF TRUST METRIC
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our trust
metric according to the following three aspects:
1) Evaluation with simulated data. We evaluate our trust
metric with simulated data. More specifically, we anal-
yse whether our trust metric can distinguish between
user types and cope with a fluctuating strategy.
2) Consistency with human opinions. We study how our
trust metric can be validated with real user data. More
specifically, given the same data set, we analyse whether
our trust metric provides the same ratings of user behav-
ior as the ones manually assigned by humans.
3) Evaluation of prediction with real data. We study
whether our trust metric can predict users future behav-
ior. In other words, we analyse whether the trust score
assigned by the trust metric to a user reflects her future
behavior.
A. Evaluation with simulated data
Our trust metric should punish fluctuating user behaviors.
Moreover, it should detect user behavior patterns, i.e. it should
be able to distinguish different types of user profiles: low,
medium and high. In this subsection, we verify that our trust
metric satisfies these criteria.
1) Fluctuating user behaviors: We define three types of
user profiles according to the values of send proportion: low,
medium and high. Similar to [28], we define that a user with
a low profile sends in average 20% of the maximum possible
amount, while for a medium profile user the send proportion
is 50% and for a high profile user it is 80%. We also define
a fluctuate profile user who first tries to behave well and then
deviates.
By means of simulations for the above user profiles, we
compare the behavior of our trust metric with the average
trust metric where the trust score is calculated by an average
of previous sending amounts [4], [14], [7], [8], [6], [24], [3].
The behavior of our trust metric in first 10 rounds is displayed
in Fig. 1 and the behavior of the simple average trust metric
is displayed in Fig. 2.
We can easily see that, our trust metric can cope and punish
the fluctuating behavior very well, as it reduces the trust score
of fluctuating user to the same as of a low profile user. On
the other side, the simple average metric cannot distinguish
between fluctuating and high profile users.
Fig. 1. Our trust metric on different user types in the first 10 interactions.
Fig. 2. The average trust metric on different user types.
2) Distinction between user types: In subsection IV-A1, we
analyzed the behavior of our trust metric on constant sending
behavior versus fluctuating behavior. However, the constant
sending behavior is not realistic, and in this section, we relax
our user profiles by allowing them to vary their behavior
around the average value. In particular, we defined the behav-
ior of low profile, medium profile and high profile as normal
distributions with means of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 respectively, with
standard deviation of 0.15 (this standard deviation value has
been approximated from [3]). In what follows we analyze
whether our trust metric can distinguish between different user
types. Hence, after a large number of rounds, trust scores of
different users will follow a distribution. In order to distinguish
between different profiles, these distributions must satisfy the
following properties:
• The trust values assigned to fluctuating users should be
similar with the trust values assigned to low profile users,
and should not overlap with the trust values assigned to
medium profile users.
• The difference between two mean values should be at
least the sum of two standard deviations. If we denote by
meanlow , meanmedium and meanhigh the mean values
of trust scores of bad profile, medium profile and high
Fig. 3. Distribution of the trust metric current trust = send proportion
after ten rounds. The trust scores assigned to fluctuating users overlap with
trust scores assigned to medium profile users.
Fig. 4. Distribution of our trust metric after ten rounds. The trust scores
assigned to fluctuating users do not overlap with trust scores assigned to
medium profile users.
profile respectively, and by stdlow , stdmedium and stdhigh
the corresponding standard deviations, then:
meanlow + stdlow ≤ meanmedium + stdmedium (12)
meanmedium + stdmedium ≤ meanhigh + stdhigh (13)
• The ratio of any two variances of these distributions
should not be larger than 3, as suggested by Keppel [29].
It is not easy to find a current trust function which can
satisfy these above requirements. After an empirical process,
the formula presented in Equation 2 is the only function we
found so far that can satisfy these requirements.
For instance, if we replace our current trust formula by
a new formula such as current trust = send proportion,
this trust metric will not be able to distinguish between
medium profile and fluctuating users. As we show in Fig. 3,
after ten rounds, the new trust metric will assign overlapping
trust scores to medium profile and fluctuating users, but our
metric still can distinguish between these two user profiles as
displayed in Fig. 4.
B. Consistency with human opinions
In this section, we evaluate our trust metric according to
user ratings obtained by an existing experimental study of the
repeated trust game [30].
Keser [30] organized a repeated trust game experiment
where users could rate in each round their partners’ sending
behavior. The three levels proposed were: negative, neutral
or positive. Based on the data published in this study, we
created three virtual users called positive user, neutral user
and negative user respectively corresponding to the levels
of possible ratings. These virtual users follow the average
behavior of real users who have the corresponding rating.
Fig. 5. Validating trust metric with real users’ ratings.
In what follows we analyse the results obtained by our trust
metric applied for the behavior of these virtual users. Since
we are using a continuous rating score and Keser was using
a discrete rating score, the two rating scores do not match
completely. However, we should expect that our trust metric
does not conflict with Keser’s results, i.e. for any two behaviors
A and B, if A was rated higher than B (for instance, positive
versus neutral or positive versus negative), our trust metric
should assign a higher trust score to A than B.
The analysis is displayed in Fig. 5. As expected, our trust
metric assigns in all cases higher trust values to positive user
than neutral user, and higher trust values to neutral user than
negative user.
The conclusion is that our trust metric and people’s opinion
about trustworthiness of behavior in repeated trust games do
not contradict each other.
C. Evaluation with real data
We showed that our trust metric matches real people’s
opinions about partner’s behavior in the past. In this section
we address the issue whether it can predict the future behavior
of users. For instance, if our trust metric assigns a high trust
value for a user, we are interested whether this particular user
behaves well or badly in the future.
We note that, a low R2 value is usual in predicting human
behavior, but in many cases, it does not mean that the
prediction is useless [17]. For instance, Ashraf et al. [22] used
a list of ten factors to predict users’ behavior in one-shot trust
game, and achieved the average R2 of 0.25.
1) Data sets: We analyze the performance of our trust
metric on three data sets.
The first data set was collected by an experiment we con-
ducted in our laboratory. We recruited 30 participants through
a public announcement and we ran five sessions, each with
six people. Before a session started, participants were asked
to read user instructions and sign a consent form. During the
experiment, users were asked to play a repeated anonymous
trust game that we implemented by using zTree [31]. However,
participants were not told the total number of rounds in order
to avoid them behaving differently at the end of the session.



























Fig. 6. An observation of fluctuating behavior from our data set.
In each round, the six participants were paired randomly, and
for each pair the roles were assigned randomly. We ensured
that during the session each user interacted exactly five times
with each other user.
The two other data sets were obtained by the experiments
described in [8] involving 36 participants and in [10] involving
108 participants. Both of these experiments are done anony-
mously, and the data is provided under the form of a behavior
log of participants.
The total data set comprises behavior of 174 participants in
repeated trust games.
2) Observation on data: First, we show that our models
on user profiles (low, medium, high and fluctuate profiles) are
consistent with data collected throughout experiments. Next,
we show that real data proves the existence of different user
types such as participants who send in average a high amount
and those who send in average a low amount. We also show
that real data proves the existence of users with a fluctuating
behavior.
We notice that changes in user behavior in repeated trust
games are very usual. Fig. 7 illustrates the average and
standard deviation of sending amount proportions of each
user in the three datasets previously mentioned. The standard
deviations of user sending proportions are large compared
with their average sending proportions, meaning that users
often change their sending behavior during the experiments.
For instance, Fig. 6 illustrates a selected user behavior from
our dataset: this player cooperates very well at beginning then
deviates and never cooperates again. We observed that in all
data sets, only few players send a constant amount throughout
a session.
Fig. 7 shows that for all three datasets, the average sending
proportions of participants vary from 0 to 1, matching with
our defined profiles: low, medium and high corresponding to
a sending proportion of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 respectively.
We can conclude that, fluctuating behavior is a fact in all
three data sets, and for this reason, it is important to design a
trust metric that copes with this behavior.
3) Predicting users’ behavior: Based on the behavior log
we applied our trust metric on users’ behavior at a certain
Fig. 7. Average and standard deviation of sending proportions in datasets.




































Fig. 8. Relationship between trust metric and user behavior at round ten in
our own experiment.
round, then used the output trust score as the independent
variable to predict the user’s behavior in the next round. For
all rounds starting with round five, we found a high correlation
between the output trust scores and user behavior in the next
round. However, due to space limitation, we present the results
of our analysis only for rounds five and ten.
In our analysis the independent variables are the trust
values for each user after fourth and ninth interaction and the
dependent variables are the sending proportions of users in
the fifth and tenth round. For the data in [8], we tested the
relationship between our trust metric and the user behavior
at round five and ten. However, because of the design of the
experiment in [10], we could only test the relationship between
our trust metric and user behavior at round five. Fig. 8 displays
the prediction of user sending behavior at round ten by using
the data set from our experiment. Fig. 9 displays the prediction
of user sending behavior at round five by using the Bravo
dataset.
The summary of all linear regressions previously mentioned
is displayed in Table II, where the independent variable (x-axis
in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9) is the trust value our metric assigned to
each user before a particular round, and the dependent variable



































Fig. 9. Relationship between trust metric and user behavior at round five in
the Bravo dataset.
TABLE II
REGRESSION BETWEEN TRUST METRIC AND FUTURE USERS’ BEHAVIOR.
Intercept Slope Adj.R2
Our dataset (round 5) 0.071 0.701*** 0.319
Our dataset (round 10) -0.022 0.913*** 0.542
Bravo dataset (round 5) -0.006 0.715*** 0.362
Dubois dataset (round 5) 0.072 0.848*** 0.356
Dubois dataset (round 10) 0.027 0.855*** 0.357
We denote ‘***’ as significant level of 99.9%.
is the behavior of this user in this round (y-axis in Fig. 8 and
Fig. 9). We can notice that the slopes of all regressions are
significant, meaning that our trust metric predicts well user’s
behavior. Similar results were obtained for the same analysis
in other rounds (i.e. a significant slope value and a positive
r-value), but, as previously mentioned, due to lack of space,
we do not present them in detail.
4) Performance comparison: As previously mentioned,
there is no prior work in predicting users behavior in repeated
trust game. For this reason, in this section, we compare our
model with two other baseline models: average model and null
model.
Average model predicts that, the next sending amount of a
user is equal to the average of her previous sending amounts.
On the other hand, the null model predicts that, the next
sending amount of a user is equal to her previous sending
amount.
In order to compare the performance of these three models,
we calculate the predicting values of each of these models.
We compute the adjusted R2 value for each model from round
five to round ten and then calculate the average of adjusted
R2. The higher average R2 a model achieves, the better this
model is in predicting users behavior.
The comparison of performance of different models is
displayed in Table III. For our data and data of Dubois, we
calculated an average adjusted R2 values in predicting users
behavior from round five to ten. As Bravo’s dataset contains
only five rounds, we computed the average adjusted R2 values
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF R2 VALUES OF DIFFERENT PREDICTING MODELS.
Average model Null model Our model
Our data 0.42 0.43 0.55
Dubois’s data 0.28 0.34 0.40
Bravo’s data 0.3 0.32 0.36
in predicting users behavior at round five.
We can see that, our model outperforms the other two
baseline models in predicting users behavior in repeated trust
games.
D. Robustness of the trust model
In this section, we consider the robustness of our model
against some common attacks to the reputation systems as
addressed in [32] with an adaptation to trust games context.
We show that our trust metric is quite robust against some
common kinds of attacks to reputation systems.
• Self-promoting attack implies that “attackers manipulate
their own reputation by falsely increasing it”. In the
context of trust games, we can define self-promoting
strategy as fluctuating strategy. Our trust metric can
punish the fluctuating strategy by assigning people who
use this strategy same score with low-profile users.
• Whitewashing attack implies that “attackers try to repair
and restore their reputation”. In trust game context, the
whitewashing strategy corresponds to users that try to
repair their reputation by behaving better than in the past.
Users adopting this strategy will be classified as having a
fluctuating strategy and therefore they need a long period
to repair their reputation.
• Slandering attack implies that “attackers try to report
false data”. There are two types of slandering attacks:
the attackers can report falsely bad information about
honest users, or can report falsely good information about
malicious users. The first type of slandering attack is not
possible to appear in our method as data is collected by
the system and not by user report. Our metric is robust
against the second type of slandering attack. In order to
falsely increase the reputation level, malicious users can
use fake accounts to increase the trust score of their main
account by providing positive reviews about it. However,
our trust metric is based on personal experience of a user
with another particular partner, and does not rely on the
relationship of this partner with other users.
V. DISCUSSION
Nowadays reputation-based systems are widely used and
trust scores assigned to users could be observed in many
popular websites, such as Wikipedia, eBay, Amazon and on-
line discussion forums (e.g. Stack Overflow). A good trust
metric can suggest honest users to select the right partners
and reduce the probability that they are cheated in on-line
environments.
Our model has a limitation: the cold-start problem. The
model requires the data for several interactions between users
in order to calculate and predict their next behavior. This
drawback generally holds for behavior modelling approaches:
without data on previous behavior no prediction can be done
[23]. Several potential solutions for this problem exist, such as
querying the information from common friends or computing
trust path through network [33].
On the other hand, our model has several advantages
compared with other approaches presented in Section II. Our
trust metric only requires the information about the interaction
between the user and the partner in the past. This information
is available on users side, without querying any central server
or other nodes in the network. The trust metric also does not
require any personal information such as gender, age, income
or Mach score, which is not always available in collaborative
systems today. These advantages facilitate the application of
our trust metric to real systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a trust metric to measure the
trustworthiness of users in repeated trust games. We prove that
our trust metric can deal with fluctuating user behavior and
can distinguish different types of participants. Moreover, we
show that our trust metric is consistent with human opinions.
Last but not least, we show that our trust metric achieves a
better performance in predicting user behavior in repeated trust
games in comparison with other baseline approaches.
As repeated trust game is a general model for studying
human cooperation, we expect that our trust metric could be
applied to collaborative systems [34] where users need to trust
and collaborate with other users such as Wikipedia or open
source software development projects.
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